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THE WORLD BANK, THE IMF AND THE 
GLOBAL PREVENTION OF TERRORISM: 
A ROLE FOR CONDITIONALITIES 
Olivera Medenica* 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
he Twin Towers, an architectural symbol of Western 
power, came crashing down on a beautiful and hopelessly 
tragic September morning.  The incredible scale of the attack 
left us horrified, bewildered, and wounded as a nation.  With 
ghastly images in our memory, the U.S. turned towards the 
bleak prospect of fighting an elusive enemy.  Like any true eco-
nomic and military superpower, our response was strong and 
immediate.  But was our response efficient, and most impor-
tantly, are we safer now than before? 
In an interview granted shortly after September 11, 2001, 
James Wolfhenson, the president of the World Bank, described 
the collapse of the Twin Towers as not only a terrorist attack of 
the grandest scale, but also as the image “of the South landing 
hard on the cradle of the North.”1  This statement is insightful 
because it is powerfully descriptive and suggests that a collec-
tive response is needed to address the issue.  Although poverty 
may not be the sole cause of terrorism, it does play a role in its 
spread.2  If that is the case, ignoring such a connection is not 
only negligent, but as has been proven, deadly. 
  
 * J.D. Brooklyn Law School, New York, 2000; B.M. Manhattan School of 
Music, 1996.  Ms. Medenica is a partner at Wahab Riveles & Medenica, and is 
currently teaching Legal Writing for the International Moot Court program at 
Brooklyn Law School.  The author would particularly like to thank Judge 
Evan J. Wallach, Professor Claire Kelly, Kaiser Wahab and Leo Balk for tak-
ing the time to read her article and provide helpful comments and edits. 
1 Maurizio Molinari, Wolfensohn: La Guerra al Terrorismo Si Vince Eliminado 
la Povertà “L’11 Settembre È Come Se L’afghanistan Fosse Sbarcato A Wall 
Street Da Allora Non Possiamo Più Ignorare I Problemi Del Sud Del Mondo” 
[The War Against Terrorism Will Be Won By Eliminating Poverty – “Septem-
ber 11 is as if Afghanistan Landed on Wall Street; Since Then, We Can No 
Longer Ignore the Problem of the South”], LA STAMPA, Dec. 12, 2001, at 5, 
available at http://digilander.libero.it/liceorodolico/guerra/Wolfensohn.htm. 
 2. Powell: Poverty Aids Terrorism, CNN MONEY, Feb. 1, 2002, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2002/02/01/news/davos_powell/index/htm. 
T
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This Article argues that the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (“IMF”), collectively the International 
Financial Institutions (“IFIs”), could play a central role in the 
war on terrorism.  As international institutions with unrivaled 
resources at their disposal, both the World Bank and the IMF 
could begin incorporating broad anti-terrorism conditions 
within their financial assistance programs.3  The IFIs could ex-
pand beyond their respective mandates and impose conditions 
that would require states seeking financial assistance to im-
plement an anti-terrorism framework designed to criminalize 
terrorist offenses, prevent potential terrorists and terrorist 
groups from using such states’ territory to further terrorist pur-
poses, and allow for the exchange of information with the neces-
sary international authorities concerning the activities and 
crimes of terrorists and terrorist groups.  In return, the funds 
provided by the IFIs could assist these states in strengthening 
their economies and ameliorating prevalent levels of poverty.  
Part II of this Article analyzes different definitions of terror-
ism and examines the leading factors contributing to its rise.  
Part III.A provides an historical and technical outline of the 
IFIs’ respective mandates and activities from their inception at 
the Bretton Woods conference to their current activities.  Part 
III.B posits a new role for the IFIs and concludes that these in-
stitutions should expand their respective mandates by provid-
ing financial assistance to address the leading factors contribut-
ing to the spread of terrorism and conditioning such assistance 
on the fulfillment of the objectives contained within United Na-
tions (“UN”) Resolution 1373.4   
II .  TERRORISM 
Terrorism, as an act of political violence, has existed for as 
long as political ideologies have been promoted.5  In the wake of 
September 11th, the subject of terrorism has become a common 
  
 3. Although the IFIs have begun to address the issue of terrorism, the 
institutions’ work has not been included as a condition for financial assistance 
and it has been limited to financing of terrorism and anti-money laundering 
issues.   
 4. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th Mtg., Supp. 1, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1373 (2001). 
 5. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 14–15 (1998). 
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staple of our daily news intake.  But aside from religious fanati-
cism, scant attention has been paid to economic and social fac-
tors underlying the proliferation of this dreadful phenomenon.  
To fully understand terrorism, attention must shift from the 
criminal nature of the act to a perception of terrorism as a 
symptom of our social pathology.  The following section will 
therefore explore the root causes of terrorism: first, through an 
examination of the various definitions of the term, and second, 
through an analysis of the key factors leading to or facilitating 
the development of this sociopolitical disease. 
A.  Definitions of Terrorism 
Although the word “terrorist” has become a part of our every-
day vocabulary, no single definition of the term has gained uni-
versal acceptance within the international community.6  This 
lack of consensus stems from the inherently pejorative nature of 
the term.7  It is a word loaded with negative connotations that 
are generally only applicable to one’s adversaries.8  As Brian 
Jenkins writes “[w]hat is called terrorism…seems to depend on 
one’s point of view.  Use of the term implies a moral judgment; 
and if one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its 
opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its 
moral viewpoint.”9  This proclivity for subjective judgment has 
spawned a great variety of definitions, each reflecting the politi-
cal slant of the particular interest group.10  Title 22 of the U.S. 
Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, po-
litically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”11 
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) defines ter-
rorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons 
or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian 
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or 
  
 6. HOFFMAN, supra note 5, at 37; see also ALEX P. SCHMID, POLITICAL 
TERRORISM: A RESEARCH GUIDE TO CONCEPTS, THEORIES, DATA BASES AND 
LITERATURE 6 (1983). 
 7. HOFFMAN, supra note 5, at 31. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. 
 10. See id. at 38. 
 11. See 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (2000).  
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social objectives.”12  The U.S. Department of Defense defines it 
as “the unlawful use of — or threatened use of — force or vio-
lence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate 
governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or 
ideological objectives.”13 
Each one of these examples partially defines terrorism. The 
first leaves out spontaneous acts of political violence along with 
the psychological dimension of terrorism.14  The second offers no 
insight as to what political or ideological aims might entail, and 
the third, although most complete, omits the social dimension of 
terrorism.15  
As explained by Bruce Hoffman, perhaps the best explanation 
of the term lies in its distinction from other types of violence.16  
When contrasted with guerrilla warfare, ordinary criminals and 
the lunatic assassin, terrorism can be understood as: 
 Ineluctably political in aims and motives; 
 Violent — or, equally important, threaten[ed] violence; 
 Designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions 
beyond the immediate victim or target; 
 Conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of 
command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members 
wear no uniform or identifying insignia); and 
 Perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.17 
Taking these elements into account, and for purposes of this 
Article, terrorism will be defined “as the deliberate creation and 
exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in 
the pursuit of political change.”18 
  
 12. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (West 2004); see also FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES: 
COUNTERTERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT AND WARNING UNIT, NATIONAL 
SECURITY DIVISION i (1998), available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/ 
terror98.pdf. 
 13. Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, Chapter 3, Department 
of the Army FM 100-20/APF3-20 (Dec. 5, 1990), available at http://www.mao-
ism.org/misc/lic/fm100-20/10020ch3.htm#s_25. 
 14. See HOFFMAN, supra note 5, at 38–39. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 40. 
 17. Id. at 43. 
 18. Id. 
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B.  State Failure 
The argument is often made that poverty causes terrorism.19  
Drawing such an equation merely provides an adumbrated ex-
planation of the problem.  It is well-known that Osama bin 
Laden, the alleged mastermind of worldwide Islamic terrorism, 
originates from great Saudi wealth.20  It is also fairly well 
known that most if not all of the September 11th hijackers were 
highly educated and received money from their families.21  But 
even if there is no direct correlation between poverty and terror-
ism, there is some validity in recognizing the connection.22  Pov-
  
 19. See Alan Friedman, UN Leader To Warn of Dangers in Wealth Gap, 
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 4, 2002, at 1; Charles Lambroschini, Guerre Contre le 
Terrorisme – Dans Un Entretien Au “Figaro”, Le Secrétaire Général des Na-
tions Unies Souligne Que La Démocratie Est Une Valeur Universelle; Kofi 
Annan: “Il Faut S’attaquer Aux Raciness Du Terrorisme, La Pauvreté Et 
L’ignorance” [War Against Terrorism: In an Interview with “Figaro” the Secre-
tary General of the UN Stresses That Democracy Is a Universal Value: Kofi 
Annan: “We Must Address The Roots of Terrorism, Poverty and Ignorance”], LE 
FIGARO, Nov. 5, 2001 at 4; Swami Agnivesh & Rev Valson Thampu, Poverty 
and Terrorism: Shared Roots (Jan. 12, 2002), available at http://www.tehelka. 
com/channels/commetary/2002/jan/12/com011202poverty.htm; Andrew De-
maria, Arroyo Links Terrorism to Poverty, CNN.com at http://www.cnn.com/ 
2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/10/29/phili.arroyo (last visited Oct. 30, 2003); 
Jim Lobe, US Report Links Terrorism with Rights, Poverty, ASIA TIMES, Mar. 
6, 2002 available at http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/DC06Ag03.html; Kuldip 
Nayar, Terrorism: Rooted in Poverty, BUS. LINE, Sept. 14, 2001, available at 
http://www.blonnet.com/businessline/2001/09/14/stories/04148503.htm; Pow-
ell: Poverty Aids Terrorism, CNN MONEY, Feb. 1. 2002 at http://money.cnn. 
com/2002/02/ 01/news/davos_powell/index.htm. 
 20. George A. Lyden, The International Money Laundering Abatement and 
Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001: Congress Wears a Blindfold While Giv-
ing Money Laundering Legislation a Facelift, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
201, 238–39 (2003) (“Bin Laden’s personal fortune has been estimated to be as 
high as $300 million.”); Juliette Bennett, Public Private Partnerships: The 
Role of the Private Sector in Preventing Funding Conflict, 35 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 711, 711–12 (2002) (“Bin Laden’s reportedly vast inherited 
wealth comes from his father’s hugely successful international construction 
company.”).  
 21. Ilias Bantekas, The International Law of Terrorist Financing, 97 AM. J. 
INT’L. L. 315, 321 (2003); Peter Finn, Hijackers Depicted as Elite Group: Euro-
pean Officials See Greater Sophistication, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2001, at A01. 
 22. Friedman, supra note 19 (quoting both U.S. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell’s and Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan’s recognition that ter-
rorism flourishes in impoverished countries); Demaria, supra note 19 (quoting 
Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as stating, “[i]t is evil that 
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erty may not be the cause of terrorism, but terrorists can ma-
nipulate poverty to their advantage. 
As Robert Rotberg notes, an alternative and more probable 
explanation to the poverty-terrorism synergy lies in the phe-
nomena of failed states.23  According to Rotberg, “[b]ecause 
failed states are hospitable to and harbor nonstate actors —
warlords and terrorists — understanding the dynamics of na-
tion-state failure is central to the war against terrorism.”24  How 
best to prevent state failure and strengthen weak states there-
fore becomes a critical component of any meaningful policy de-
bate about terrorism prevention.  
So what is state failure, and how does a state become a failing 
or failed state?  As Rotberg states, “[n]ation-states fail because 
they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer de-
liver positive political goods to their people.”25  He distinguishes 
between several incremental stages of nation-state failure: gen-
eral weakness or apparent distress, failure, and collapse.26  The 
extent to which a state performs well on the success-failure 
spectrum hinges on its capacity to deliver political goods to its 
citizens.27  These political goods “encompass expectations, con-
ceivably obligations, inform the local political culture, and to-
gether give content to the social contract between ruler and 
ruled that is at the core of regime/government and citizenry in-
teractions.”28 
Although each political good carries great weight, there is a 
hierarchy of political goods.29  None is as crucial as a state’s ob-
  
causes terrorism but the evil needs to spread its ideology as a mass base and 
the best breeding ground is poverty”).  
 23. See generally STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS IN A TIME OF TERROR 
(Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2003) [hereinafter ROTBERG, IN A TIME OF TERROR]; 
Robert I. Rotberg, The New Nature of Nation-State Failure, 25 WASH. Q. 85, 
2002 [hereinafter Rotberg, The New Nature of Nation-State Failure]; Robert I. 
Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, 81 FOREIGN AFF. July-Aug. 2002 
[hereinafter Rotberg, Failed States]. 
 24. Rotberg, The New Nature of Nation-State Failure, supra note 23, at 85. 
 25. Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes 
and Indicators in STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS IN A TIME OF TERROR 1 
(Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2003) [hereinafter Rotberg, Causes and Indicators]. 
 26. Id.   
 27. See id. at 1–2. 
 28. Id. at 3. 
 29. Id. 
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ligation to provide security to its citizenry; a state must be able 
to control its borders within and without.30  It must not only 
have the capacity to prevent cross-border invasions, but it must 
also provide its citizens the opportunity to resolve disputes 
without recourse to arms.31  Once security has been sustained, 
the delivery of other political goods becomes possible.32 
A state must also provide a predictable and recognizable sys-
tem of adjudicating disputes.33  It must regulate and protect the 
rights of its citizens by establishing codes and procedures, as 
well as a judicial system that effectively symbolizes and vali-
dates the local principles of justice and fair play.34  
Another important political good is the right of citizens to lib-
erally participate and contribute to the political process.  This 
includes: “the right to compete for office; respect and support for 
national and regional political institutions, like legislatures and 
courts; tolerance of dissent and difference; and fundamental 
civil and human rights.”35 
Other remaining goods that similarly play an essential role in 
the development of a healthy, or successful, state include: 
[M]edical and health care (at varying levels and costs); schools 
and educational instruction (of various kinds and levels) — the 
knowledge good; roads, railways, harbors, and other physical 
infrastructures — the arteries of commerce; communications 
infrastructures; a money and banking system, usually pre-
sided over by a central bank and lubricated by a national cur-
rency; a beneficent fiscal and institutional context within 
which citizens can pursue personal entrepreneurial goals and 
potentially prosper; the promotion of civil society; and methods 
of regulating the sharing of the environmental commons.36 
Whether a state is categorized as weak, strong, or failed will 
not depend on its success or failure to deliver a particular good, 
but rather on its overall performance in the hierarchy of politi-
cal goods.37  Strong states will undoubtedly perform well in all of 
  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 3–4.  
 37. Id. at 4. 
File: Olivera3.22.macro.doc Created on:  3/22/2004 2:32 PM Last Printed: 3/29/2004 11:40 AM 
670 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:2 
the categories.38  Weak states, however, will provide a sporadic 
and inconsistent performance, fulfilling some or few of the po-
litical good categories.39  The fewer categories a state is capable 
of fulfilling, the more it tends to edge towards the brink of fail-
ure.40   
In contrast, failed states deliver limited quantities, if any, of 
essential political goods.41  They are deeply conflicted, divided by 
civil wars or disobedience, and are generally typified by weak 
institutions and a corrupt leadership.42  According to Rotberg, 
failed states share the following characteristics: 
[A] rise in criminal and political violence; a loss of control over 
their borders; rising ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural 
hostilities; civil war; the use of terror against their own citi-
zens; weak institutions; a deteriorated or insufficient infra-
structure; an inability to collect taxes without undue coercion; 
high levels of corruption; a collapsed health system; rising lev-
els of infant mortality and declining life expectancy; the end of 
regular schooling opportunities; declining levels of GDP per 
capita; escalating inflation; a widespread preference for non-
national currencies; and basic food shortages, leading to star-
vation.43 
Because failed states are unable or unwilling to deliver key 
political goods, they are vulnerable to attacks upon their fun-
damental legitimacy.44  When a self-serving ruling elite is per-
ceived as working for itself and not the state, citizens begin to 
seek alternative sectional and community loyalties.45  Group 
leaders or communal warlords, some deriving support from out-
side sources, answer this demand for support and security.46  It 
is at this stage that terror is likely to breed.47 
In the final stages of failure, a state becomes truly collapsed.48  
Although a rare and extreme case, the collapsed state is typified 
  
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 4. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 6. 
 42. See id. at 5–6, 8. 
 43. Rotberg, Failed States supra note 23, at 132. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 133. 
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by a clear power vacuum.49  The state becomes a geographic ex-
pression of meaningless borders.50  In this state of deconstruc-
tion, warlords or local group leaders take over and install their 
version of statehood by setting up local security, markets and 
trading arrangements.51   
The relative successes and failures of states operate on a 
broad continuum, and no particular stage is terminal or perma-
nent.  The international community’s ability to recognize a 
state’s slide into failure is crucial in light of a failed state’s vul-
nerability as a breeding ground for terrorism.  But mere recog-
nition of these warning signs, although a feat by itself, is insuf-
ficient to produce positive change.  The international commu-
nity must be ready to react, and to this end, it must be ready to 
commit time, energy and most importantly, resources to help 
prevent a state’s slide into failure.   
III.  A NEW ROLE FOR THE IFIS 
Although few may disagree that terrorism must be addressed 
on a global scale, questions remain as to how the international 
community should achieve such an objective.52  A meaningful 
response must be three dimensional.  It must address the root 
causes of the problem, provide a regulatory framework to pre-
vent future infractions and ensure compliance through an effec-
tive enforcement mechanism.  The following section will exam-
ine a possible role for the IMF and the World Bank, first 
through a brief overview of the IFIs’ respective fields of opera-
tion and the extent to which these institutions’ policies and 
lending facilities have evolved over time; and second, through 
an analysis of loan conditions and their potential meaning in 
the war against terrorism. 
A.  The IMF and World Bank 
The IMF and the World Bank were created out of coordinated 
efforts by the major Allied governments to revive international 
  
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. at 133–34. 
 52. See discussion, infra, at Part II.A.  See Jennifer Trahan, Terrorism 
Conventions: Existing Gaps and Different Approaches, 8 NEW ENG. INT’L & 
COMP. L. ANN. 215, 220–21 (2002). 
File: Olivera3.22.macro.doc Created on:  3/22/2004 2:32 PM Last Printed: 3/29/2004 11:40 AM 
672 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:2 
trade in the post-World War II era.53  The sharp economic down-
turn of the Great Depression and the military investment, both 
human and economic, of World War II had left the global econ-
omy in severe need of a panacea for its fiscal ailments.54  
In 1944, representatives of 45 governments met at the UN 
Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire, in order to finance the rebuilding of a war-torn 
Europe and to prevent future economic depressions.55  The con-
sensus was to emphasize transnational commerce by building a 
system supported by cooperation and interdependence in the 
fields of trade and monetary policy.56  Out of this agreement 
emerged the IMF and the World Bank.57 
1. The Institutional Organization of the IMF 
The IMF was created as a specialized agency of the UN de-
signed to promote the stability of the international monetary 
system.58  Its central objective is to prevent economic crises from 
occurring by advising member states on the soundness of their 
economic policies and to provide temporary financing for mem-
ber states experiencing balance of payments problems.59  
  
 53. Rajesh Swaminathan, Regulating Development: Structural Adjustment 
and the Case for National Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 37 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 161, 164 (1998). 
 54. See Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 164.  See generally International 
Monetary Fund, What is the International Monetary Fund, at http://www.imf. 
org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2003) [hereinafter 
What is the IMF?].  
 55. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 11 (2002).  
See also What is the IMF?, supra note 54. 
 56. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 164. 
 57. Id.; see also STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 11. 
 58. What is the IMF?, supra note 54.  
 59. See id.  Benefiting from an almost global membership of 183 states, the 
IMF reports to the ministries of finance and the central banks of governments 
of its member states. See id.; STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 12.  A Board of Gov-
ernors, representing all member states, is the highest authority within the 
institution and meets once a year to decide on major policy issues.  See What 
is the IMF?, supra note 54.  Day-to-day operations are left to the Executive 
Board which meets several times per week at the IMF’s headquarters in 
Washington, D.C.  See id.  The Executive Board consists of a total of 24 Execu-
tive Directors with the United States, Japan, Germany, France, United King-
dom, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, having their own seats on the Board, 
and the remaining directors elected on a rotating two-year basis.  See id.  De-
cisions are made based on a weighted voting system with the state with the 
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The IMF’s statutory purposes are embodied in its Articles of 
Agreement.60 Its purposes include the promotion of balanced 
world trade expansion, exchange rate stability, the establish-
ment of a multilateral system of payments, and temporary fi-
nancial assistance to member states experiencing balance of 
payment problems.61  To further its goals, the IMF examines the 
  
larger “quota” having more votes.  See id.  These quotas are essentially capital 
subscriptions that members pay upon joining the institution and are intended 
to reflect each member’s relative size in the global economy.  See id.  As quo-
tas are determined by the economic size of a country, it is the major developed 
countries that benefit from greater voting powers.  STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 
12.  As a result of this, the United States benefits from an actual veto power.  
Id.    
 60. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, opened for 
signature Dec. 27, 1945, 160 Stat. 1401, as amended April 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 
2203, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/in-
dex.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2004)  [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agreement]. 
 61. Article I of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund provides: 
The purposes of the International Monetary Fund are:  
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a 
permanent institution which provides the machinery for consul-
tation and collaboration on international monetary problems. 
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of interna-
tional trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and 
maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to 
the development of the productive resources of all members as 
primary objectives of economic policy. 
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange 
arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive ex-
change depreciation. 
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of 
payments in respect of current transactions between members 
and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which 
hamper the growth of world trade. 
(v) To give confidence to members by making the general re-
sources of the Fund temporarily available to them under ade-
quate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to cor-
rect maladjustments in their balance of payments without resort-
ing to measures destructive of national or international prosper-
ity. 
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performance of each member’s economy as a whole, focusing 
mainly on its macroeconomic policies — policies on exchange 
rates, the management of money, and the member state’s gov-
ernment budget — and financial sector policies.62  The IMF also 
places due consideration on a member state’s structural poli-
cies, such as labor market policies, that could potentially affect 
macroeconomic performance.63  Additionally, the institution ad-
vises its members on the best course of action in re-evaluating 
national policies so they more effectively pursue objectives such 
as high employment, low inflation, and sustainable economic 
growth.64  This technical assistance is further supplemented 
with training programs for government and central bank offi-
cials of member states.65 
An important aspect of the institution’s organization is its 
ability to provide loans to member states experiencing balance 
of payment problems.  Maintaining a healthy balance is a cen-
tral precondition to the IMF’s founding purpose of promoting 
global economic stability.66  Should a member state find itself 
unable to comply with this condition, Article I of the IMF’s Arti-
cles of Agreement provides that it is required to make funds 
“temporarily available to [member states] under adequate safe-
guards…to correct maladjustments in their balance-of-
payments without resorting to measures destructive of national 
or international prosperity.”67 
  
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and 
lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances 
of payments of members. 
The IMF shall be guided in all its policies and decisions by the purposes set 
forth in this Article.  IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 60, at art. 1, 29 
U.S.T. at 2205, 2 U.N.T.S. at 40, available at http://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/aa/index.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2004). 
 62. What is the IMF?, supra note 54; IMF Articles of Agreement, supra 
note 60, art. I, para. v, 29 U.S.T. at 2203, 2 U.N.T.S. at 40, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2004). 
 63. What is the IMF?, supra note 54. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 60, art. I, para. v, 29 U.S.T. at 
2203, 2 U.N.T.S. at 40, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/ 
index.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2004). 
 67. Id.   
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The institution’s lending, however, is conditional on the bor-
rowing state’s adoption of IMF policies designed to correct its 
balance of payments problems.68  Article V(3)(a) of the IMF’s 
Articles of Agreement provides that  
[t]he Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its general re-
sources… and may adopt special policies for special balance of 
payments problems, that will assist members to solve their 
balance of payments problems in a manner consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement and that will establish adequate 
safeguards for the temporary use of the general resources of 
the Fund.69 
These performance-based conditionalities enable the IMF to 
“independently…examine [the] country’s need for balance of 
payments assistance and to require the adoption of corrective 
policies before funds are disbursed.”70  Conditions may include 
trade liberalization measures, depreciation of the exchange 
rate, decreasing the fiscal deficit, and restrictions on the credit 
provided by domestic banks.71  According to the IMF, “[t]he con-
ditionality associated with IMF lending helps to ensure that by 
borrowing from the IMF, a country does not just postpone hard 
choices and accumulate more debt, but is able to strengthen its 
economy and repay the loan.”72 
  
 68. What is the IMF?, supra note 54. 
 69. IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 60, art. V sec. 3(a), 29 U.S.T. at 
2211, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 18, 2004). 
 70. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 166; see also International Monetary 
Fund, Regulation of International Finance: Guidelines on Conditionality, Ex-
ecutive Board Decision No. 6056-(79/88), 1 B.D.I.E.L. 391 (Mar. 2, 1979).  
 71. Mary C. Tsai, Globalization and Conditionality: Two Sides of the Sov-
ereignty Coin, 31 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1317, 1321 (2000). 
 72. What is the IMF?, supra note 54.  The IMF provides for various preven-
tative and protective measures to ensure that the borrowing member state 
has fulfilled the loan’s conditionalities.  Compliance is established where the 
borrowing state has satisfied certain criteria “designed to measure the impact 
of fiscal and monetary policy on external viability.”  Swaminathan, supra note 
53, at 166.  The institution’s standards for determining the borrowing member 
state’s compliance “will normally be confined to (i) macroeconomic variables, 
and (ii) those [criteria] necessary to implement specific provisions of the Arti-
cles or policies adopted under them.  Performance criteria may relate to other 
variables only in exceptional cases….”  International Monetary Fund, Execu-
tive Board Decision No. 6056-(79/38), 1.B.D.I.E.L. 393 (Mar. 2, 1979), re-
printed in JOSEPH GOLD, CONDITIONALITY 30 (International Monetary Fund, 
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2. The Institutional Organization of the World Bank 
The World Bank is a multilateral institution that enables 
member states to assist in the collective “promotion, world-
wide, of sustainable economic development and poverty reduc-
tion.”73  These objectives are pursued through lending, the pro-
duction of research and economic analysis and the provision of 
policy advice and technical assistance.74 
A product of World War II, the World Bank was initially en-
visioned to address the financial needs of a post-war reconstruc-
tion.75  Harry Dexter White, a U.S. Treasury official and one of 
the original drafters of the plan for the World Bank, stated that 
the primary objectives of the World Bank were to “provide or 
otherwise stimulate long-term, low-interest-rate loans for re-
construction and for the development of capital-poor areas.”76  
Reconstruction was, nevertheless, the World Bank’s dominating 
objective during the initial decade and a half of the its life.77  By 
the early 1960s, however, the political topography of the world 
had been drastically altered.78  Adapting to this changing politi-
cal reality led the World Bank to shift its priorities “from recon-
struction to development and from Europe to the developing 
world.”79  
  
Pamphlet Series No. 31, 1979).  If the IMF deems that the borrowing member 
state has failed to comply with these conditionalities, it can refuse to release 
the next disbursement.  Tsai, supra note 71, at 1322. 
 73. THE WORLD BANK: STRUCTURE AND POLICIES 10 (Christopher L. Gilbert 
& David Vines eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE WORLD BANK: STRUCTURE AND 
POLICIES].  The World Bank was also created as a specialized agency of the 
United Nations.  The World Bank, What is the World Bank, at http://web. 
worldbank.org (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).  
 74. THE WORLD BANK: STRUCTURE AND POLICIES, supra note 73, at 10. 
 75. Id. at 14. 
 76. Id.   
 77. Id.   
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.  Commonly perceived as a single lending institution specializing in 
development strategies, the World Bank is actually a large organization com-
prising an amalgam of four smaller units operating under the title of ‘World 
Bank Group.’  Id. at 12.  The original and central member of the World Bank 
Group is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(“IBRD”).  Id.  Its principal objective is “to borrow funds and lend these on to 
qualifying member governments or to public sector institutions for agreed 
projects.”  Id.  The second unit of the World Bank is the International Devel-
opment Agency which functions as an aid agency, mainly confining its activi-
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Although the membership of the World Bank is coextensive 
with the membership of the IMF, the working objectives of the 
World Bank differ markedly from those of the IMF, most no-
ticeably in that the World Bank functions first and foremost in 
its banking capacity as a financial intermediary.80  It raises 
money by selling bonds on the international capital market and 
subsequently lends these funds to member states at a small 
mark-up over the World Bank’s AAA81 borrowing rate.82   It 
  
ties to 60 “IDA countries” that have a low GDP per capita.  Id.  Although the 
IBRD and the IDA are almost entirely coextensive, differences basically center 
on the duration of the loan, its interest rates and the source of the loaned 
funds.  Id. at 12–13.  In essence, “[t]he Bank, as IDA, provides both develop-
ment assistance and development aid while, as the IBRD, it provides assis-
tance and enhanced access to capital.”  Id. at 13.  The third unit of the World 
Bank is the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”), which was founded in 
1956.  Id. at 12.  This institution’s main objective is to strengthen domestic 
industries by lending to private sector institutions and taking equity shares in 
private sector enterprises.  Id.  The fourth and last unit is the Multinational 
Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”), which was created in 1988.  Id.  Its 
objective is to guarantee “private sector investors against expropriation and 
repatriation risks in developing countries.”  Id.  
 80. See THE WORLD BANK: STRUCTURE AND POLICIES, supra note 73, at 17.  
As provided in its Articles of Agreement, the membership of the World Bank 
is limited to sovereign states who are already members of the IMF.  Swamina-
than, supra note 53, at 168.  Similarities between the two institutions also 
extend to the World Bank’s organizational and voting structures.  The Board 
of Governors, representing all member states, has all of the World Bank’s 
powers vested in it, while the Executive Directors conduct the institution’s 
daily operations.  See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, art. V, 
sec. 2, 60 Stat. 1440, as amended Dec. 16, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 1942, 2 U.N.T.S. 
134 [hereinafter World Bank Articles of Agreement].  As in the IMF, there is a 
total of 24 Executive Directors with the United States, Japan, Germany, 
France, United Kingdom, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, having their own 
seats on the Board, and the remaining directors elected on a rotating two-year 
basis.  See World Bank, IBRD/IFC/IDA Executive Directors and Alternates, at 
http://siteresources. worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/b-eds.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2003).  Decisions are also based on a weighted voting system based on 
capital subscriptions and on each member state’s economic strength.  World 
Bank Articles of Agreement, arts. II para. 3 and V para. 3, 60 Stat. 1441–54, 2 
U.N.T.S. 136–72; see also World Bank, IBRD: Votes and Subscriptions, at 
http://web.worbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZA 
TION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:20124831~menuPK:64020035~pagePK:64020
054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036,00.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2003). 
 81. An AAA-rating is the highest possible rating issued by rating agencies 
such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.  An AAA rating signifies a guarantee 
that anyone who purchases AAA-rated bonds will be sure to get their money 
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lends either “directly to a member government or [requires that 
its loans be] guaranteed by the member government in whose 
territory the project [or program] is located.”83  In addition, the 
World Bank restricts the use of such loans “for the foreign ex-
change component of specific [programs or] projects.”84 
Disbursement of aid is, however, conditional on the borrowing 
state’s adoption of specified conditionalities.  Article III(4) of the 
World Bank’s Articles of Agreement provides that the World 
Bank may provide loans “to any member or any political sub-
division thereof and any business, industrial, and agricultural 
enterprise in the territories of a member,”  subject to the condi-
tion that the member state fully guarantee the repayment of 
the principal and interest.85  The World Bank is further obli-
gated to “pay due regard to the prospect that the borrower… 
will be in [the] position to meet its obligations under the 
loan…”86 The World Bank’s conditionalities are comprehensive, 
and generally include policy and structural reforms in the bor-
rowing state including improved governance, the elimination of 
corruption and gender equality, among many others.87 
3. The Changing Nature of the World Bank and the IMF 
Since their inception in 1944, the World Bank and the IMF 
have changed significantly in their respective scope of opera-
tions.  Lending facilities have expanded from short-term reme-
dial measures based on specific projects, to extensive policy-
  
back, with the agreed interest, when the bonds mature.  See John Burgess, 
Groups Plan Boycott of World Bank Bonds, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2000 at E03, 
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wbank/bonds.htm; 
see also The World Bank’s Bonds Are Getting Looser, at http://www.wbbe 
urope.org/tool-kit-article3.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).  
 82. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 168; THE WORLD BANK: STRUCTURE 
AND POLICIES, supra note 73, at 12. 
 83. Kim Reisman, The World Bank and the IMF: At the Forefront of World 
Transformation, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S349, 353 (1992)(citations omitted).  
 84. Id.   
 85. World Bank Article of Agreement, supra note 80, art. III, sec. 4., 60 
Stat. at 1443, 2 U.N.T.S. at 144. 
 86. Id.  World Bank Articles of Agreement, supra note 80, art. III, sec. 4, 
para. 5, 16 U.S.T. at 1443–44, 2 U.N.T.S. at 144.  
 87. See Herbert V. Morais, The Globalization of Human Rights Law and 
The Role of International Financial Institutions in Promoting Human Rights, 
33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 71, 94–95 (2000). 
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oriented programmatic interventions, often encompassing im-
portant regulatory and structural changes in developing mem-
ber states.  These institutions’ ranges of activities have also be-
come increasingly intertwined, most distinctively during the 
last two decades. 
The 1980s trumpeted the benefits of free market ideology, 
and the IMF and the World Bank became the “new missionary 
institutions” emblematic of this change.88   From this prevalent 
political climate emerged a new “Washington Consensus,” a 
doctrine based upon the consensus of the IMF, the World Bank, 
and the U.S. Treasury.89  The Washington Consensus was dedi-
cated to: “(i) deregulation and opening domestic markets to for-
eign goods and services; (ii) freeing trade and (iii) opening do-
mestic capital markets to the free flow of international capi-
tal.”90  The Bretton Woods institutions were to promote these 
objectives by: “(i) facilitating the rapid liberalization of the 
goods markets and removing or reducing barriers to trade (ii) 
encouraging Governments to tighten fiscal and monetary poli-
cies (iii) promoting stable exchange rates and (iv) liberalizing 
capital markets.”91  Although the IMF and the World Bank’s 
respective missions remained and continue to remain separate 
and distinct, it is during this time period that their activities 
became increasingly co-dependant and intertwined.92  A brief 
retrospective of these institutions’ lending facilities and respec-
tive activities provides a revealing illustration of this structural 
shift towards a Washington Consensus policy-based orientation. 
a. World Bank Lending Facilities 
The World Bank’s founders intended primarily to provide as-
sistance by guaranteeing private loans.93  In the 1950s, however, 
the World Bank’s original scope was expanded to provide direct 
loans to developing states experiencing a scarcity of private ex-
  
 88. STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 13. 
 89. G. Sivalingam, The Impact of Globalization on the Malaysian Economy 
2, at http://www.insead.edu/events/eamsa/papers/sivalingam.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2003). 
 90. Id.   
 91. Id. 
 92. STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 13. 
 93. EDWARD S. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE 
BRETTON WOODS 26 (1973). 
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ternal sources of finance.94  These loans were provided for 
through Structural Adjustment Programs (“SAP”) whereby fi-
nancing could serve as a “[vehicle] for the design and implemen-
tation of projects, particularly in the infrastructure sector.”95  In 
the late 1970s, the World Bank further expanded its scope of 
operations to focus on inappropriate public policies in develop-
ing countries that were burdened with “large fiscal defi-
cits…unsustainable balance-of-payments deficit[s] and…open or 
repressed inflation.”96  Local governments often further exacer-
bated the rampant financial hardship of these countries by pur-
suing “expansionary demand policies.”97   
Conscious of the difficulties that such unstable macroeco-
nomic environments presented, the World Bank cast aside the 
use of project-oriented initiatives and started resorting to Struc-
tural Adjustment Lending (“SAL”).98  This lending facility was 
geared for “quick-disbursing balance-of-payments support to 
assist [developing] member countries in implementing a less 
costly adjustment to external shocks.”99  These loans, however, 
imposed significant conditions upon the disbursement of finan-
cial assistance.  Member states were expected to “achieve both 
long-term macroeconomic stabilization and structural transfor-
mation of [their economies] by addressing the fundamental 
causes of [their] economic crises.”100  More specifically, they were 
required to “bring…the level of demand and its composition 
([the proportion of] tradable relative to non-tradable goods), into 
line with the level of output and external financing.”101  These 
objectives were to be accomplished through the implementation 
of policies and legislation designed to achieve the necessary 
  
 94. Sisters in the Wood: Distant Relations, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1991, at 9 
[hereinafter Distant Relations]. 
 95. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 169. 
 96. Vittorio Corbo & Stanley Fischer, Adjustment Programs and Bank 
Support: Rationale and Main Results, in ADJUSTMENT LENDING REVISITED: 
POLICIES TO RESTORE GROWTH 7 (Vittorio Corbo et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter 
Corbo & Fischer, Adjustments Programs].   
 97. Id.   
 98. See ADJUSTMENT LENDING REVISITED: POLICIES TO RESTORE GROWTH 1 
(Vittorio Corbo et al. eds., 1992).   
 99. Id.    
 100. Corbo & Fischer, Adjustments Programs, supra note 96, at 7 (emphasis 
in original). 
 101. Id.   
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macroeconomic corrections.102  The recurrent use of this facility 
throughout the 1980s resulted in SALs accounting for a quarter 
of World Bank lending by the end of the decade.103  
In order to ensure the success rates of SALs, however, the 
World Bank limited the availability of this lending facility to 
member states already benefiting from an IMF sponsored stabi-
lization program.104  In this way, the World Bank essentially 
came to condition its loans upon explicit approval from the IMF.  
Although this arrangement did improve the probabilities for 
high success rates, this “no Fund programme, no SAL” rule 
eventually proved a nuisance.105  The World Bank therefore in-
troduced the Sector Adjustment Loan (“SECAL”), which was 
directed at states lacking an IMF program.106  These loans “sup-
port[] policy changes and institutional reforms in a specific sec-
tor” and “focus on major sectoral issues such as the incentive 
and regulatory frameworks for private sector development, in-
stitutional capability, and sector expenditure programs.”107  
The most noteworthy characteristic of the SALs and SECALs, 
however, is their heavy emphasis on policy-based objectives.108  
Whereas the World Bank was initially focused on small, project-
based facilities, it eventually expanded to address the general 
macroeconomic stability and balance of payments problems of 
developing member states.   
b.  IMF Lending Facilities 
The IMF similarly shifted from small scale lending facilities 
to comprehensive initiatives heavily slanted towards policy-
  
 102. See Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The 
World Bank and the Democratization of Development, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
159, 160 (1993) (arguing the World Bank uses it leverage to “legislate entire 
legal regimes…and often rewrite[s] a country’s trade policies, [and] fiscal poli-
cies”).  Id. at 160.  
 103. See id. at 175–76. 
 104. Sisters in the Wood; Until Debt Us Do Part, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1991, 
at 14 [hereinafter Until Debt Us Do Part]. 
 105. See id.  
 106. Id.  
 107. WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK LENDING INSTRUMENTS: RESOURCES FOR 
DEVELOPMENT IMPACT, at 17, at http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/wbactiviti 
es/lend.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).  
 108. See Cahn, supra note 102, at 174–75; see also Distant Relations, supra 
note 94; see also Until Debt Us Do Part, supra note 104. 
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oriented objectives.109  The IMF was created to offer member 
states temporary facilities in order to maintain the stability of 
the international monetary system.110  To achieve this objective, 
the IMF provided, and continues to provide, for diverse means 
of access to available funds, the amount of which is directly re-
lated to each member state’s quota.111   
At its inception, funds were divided into a “reserve tranche” 
and four equivalent “credit tranches.”112  The reserve tranche 
was part of a member’s own reserves kept on deposit with the 
IMF and access to it was virtually unimpeded.113  Each of the 
credit tranches, however, represented 25% of the member’s 
quota and a member’s access to any of them was conditioned on 
the IMF’s authorization.114  While the first tranche was fairly 
easy to obtain, access to the remaining three credit tranches 
was subject to much closer scrutiny and “almost always re-
quire[d] a stand-by or similar arrangement”115 between the IMF 
and the borrowing member state.   
These stand-by arrangements were essentially agreements 
between the IMF and member states providing for the latter’s 
borrowing of hard currencies, should the need arise.116  As they 
were intended to “provide short-term balance-of-payments as-
sistance for deficits of a temporary or cyclical nature,”117 they 
had to be repaid within three years and “were assessed near 
market interest rates.”118  Moreover, stand-bys were only dis-
bursed in installments and included “rigid performance [based] 
conditionalities.”119  The structure of these arrangements illus-
  
 109. See Distant Relations, supra note 94. 
 110. What is the IMF?, supra note 54; see also Sisters in the Wood; A Fund 
by Design, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1991, at 14 [hereinafter A Fund by Design]. 
 111. A Fund by Design, supra note 110, at 7.  A “quota” is each IMF member 
state’s proportion of contribution of gold to the IMF and their concomitant 
ability to draw from the IMF.  See The IMF and the World Bank – The Origins 
of the IFIs, at http://www.globalization101.org/issue/imfworldbank/2.asp (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2004). 
 112. See id.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 171. 
 119. Id.  
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trates that these lending facilities were not meant to address 
any issues of a “structural or socioeconomic nature” within the 
borrowing member state, but rather solely focused on the IMF’s 
primary objective of economic stabilization.120 
The IMF, however, began expanding its facilities by the early 
1980s as it experienced difficulties in addressing balance of 
payments problems through its customary lending facilities.121  
To address the complexities of an increasingly unstable mone-
tary environment, the IMF introduced the Extended Fund Fa-
cility (“EFF”).122  This facility was designed to allow member 
states to borrow up to 140 percent of their quota with a repay-
ment period of four to ten years instead of three to five years.123  
Still an insufficient tool to address the pervasive debt obliga-
tions of the poorest states, the institution further expanded its 
facilities in 1986 by establishing the Structural Adjustment Fa-
cility (“SAF”), which charged an interest rate of only one-half 
percent.124  SAF loans included a repayment period of five to ten 
years, and “were financed by sovereign repayments to the IMF 
during the 1970’s and disbursed to finance three-year stabiliza-
tion programs.”125 
As the SAF resources neared depletion, the IMF introduced 
yet another type of loan, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility (“ESAF”).126  The funds were raised through contribu-
tions of major developed member governments, and borrowing 
states could receive double the amount obtainable under the 
  
 120. See id.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id.; see also International Monetary Fund, Executive Board Decision 
No. 4377-(74/114), Sept. 13, 1974, art. I(iv), in SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 33 (1987). 
 123. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 171; see also International Monetary 
Fund, Executive Board Decision No. 6339-(79/179), Dec. 3, 1979, in SELECTED 
DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 
50, 50–54 (1976); International Monetary Fund, Executive Board Decision No. 
6830-(81/65), Apr. 22, 1981, in SELECTED DECISIONS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 515, 515–16 (June 30, 1997). 
 124. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 172; see also INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT: CONCESSIONAL FACILITIES RESIST 
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES, IMF SURVEY: SUPPLEMENT ON THE IMF 1, 21 (1993).  
 125. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 172; see also Until Debt Us Do Part, 
supra note 104. 
 126. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 172. 
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SAF.127  The major difference, however, was that the condition-
alities and the scrutiny attached to these loans was much 
stricter.128  In addition, “ESAF funds were disbursed in smaller 
installments than under the SAF, and subjected to frequent 
performance-based tests.”129  The IMF’s satisfaction with the 
performance of its new lending facilities at the close of the dec-
ade resulted in its establishment of about 30 SAF and ESAF 
facilities in Africa, and the virtual disappearance of EFFs and 
standbys from the continent.130 
The IMF’s use of the SAF and ESAF lending facilities marked 
a change in the institution’s method of addressing balance of 
payments inequities.  Whereas loans were initially short-term 
and typically focused on redressing balance of payments prob-
lems, they gradually evolved into policy-based instruments re-
quiring the implementation of important structural and policy 
changes within the borrowing government.131  Furthermore, as 
the majority of these stabilizing facilities were disbursed to the 
developing world, the IMF’s activities increasingly became de-
velopmental in nature.132   
This overlap of activities between the IMF’s progressive pol-
icy-based facilities and the World Bank’s original developmen-
tal mandate was eventually formally reinforced in an official 
agreement between the two Bretton Woods institutions.133  In 
March of 1989, the World Bank and the IMF entered into a 
“concordat” whereby the two institutions formalized their al-
ready established practice that World Bank structural adjust-
ment loans would exclude member states lacking an IMF stabi-
lization program.134  They further agreed that “the IMF would 
have ‘primary responsibility’ over short-term stabilization and 
exchange rates, and the Bank would be in the lead on medium 
and longer-term structural reform.”135 In this way, the World 
Bank and IMF operations became officially and permanently 
  
 127. Id.; see also Until Debt Us Do Part, supra note 104. 
 128. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 172. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 172–73. 
 133. Id. at 173. 
 134. Id.; see also Until Debt Us Do Part, supra note 104. 
 135. Until Debt Us Do Part, supra note 104. 
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interconnected and their combined policies of stabilization and 
structural adjustment developed into a standard feature of 
World Bank and IMF interventions. 
4.  Conditionality 
A central and controversial aspect of World Bank and IMF 
activities is reflected in the institutions’ use of conditions for 
their lending facilities.136 As with many exchanging partners, 
the IFIs require debtor states to provide credible commitments 
to increase certainty of repayment and ensure cooperation in 
the implementation of the loans.  These commitments, or condi-
tions, essentially provide an infrastructure which the IFIs be-
lieve will allow the debtor state to stabilize, grow, and pay off 
the debt.137  Although the IFIs have been severely criticized for 
the inclusion of conditions reflecting policy-oriented objectives, 
conditionalities remain an integral component of the institu-
tions’ lending facilities and have grown to include matters pre-
viously considered outside of the institutions’ scope of activi-
ties.138  
a.  Conditions Defined 
The conditions that the various borrowing states submit to 
are quasi-contractual in nature, as is underscored by the defini-
tion of “conditionality.”139  Tony Killick defines aid conditionality 
as “a mutual arrangement by which a government takes, or 
promises to take, certain policy actions, in support of which an 
IFI…or other agency will provide specified amounts of financial 
assistance.”140  Others define it as “the linking of the disburse-
ment of a loan to understandings concerning the economic pol-
icy which the government of the borrower country intends to 
  
 136. See generally MICHEL CHOSSUDOVSKY, THE GLOBALIZATION OF POVERTY: 
IMPACTS OF IMF AND WORLD BANK REFORMS 45–75 (1997); See generally 
STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 43–52. 
 137. CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 136, at 45; STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 44.  
 138. STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 44–45; see also discussion, infra at Part 
II.A.3.a.  
 139. The definitions included in this section are equally applicable to the 
IMF’s and World Bank’s practices. 
 140. TONY KILLICK ET AL., AID AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POLICY 
CHANGE 6 (1998). 
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pursue.”141 These conditions enable the IMF and the World Bank 
“independently to examine the country’s need for balance of 
payments assistance and to require the adoption of corrective 
policies before funds are disbursed.”142 
“Although the failure of a member state to meet these condi-
tions is not a fortiori a breach of contract or a violation of inter-
national law,” there are three important repercussions for non-
compliance.143  First, the institutions may limit, or restrict, the 
noncompliant nation’s credit.144  In order to ensure compliance, 
the IMF and the World Bank condition the release of credit 
upon the borrowing state’s fulfillment of performance criteria 
previously stipulated in a credit agreement.145  A borrowing 
state must therefore fulfill these performance criteria in order 
to be deemed compliant with the conditions.146  Second, the in-
stitutions can suspend the next disbursement if they determine 
that the borrowing state has failed to comply with these condi-
tions.147  Finally, because private creditors consider the institu-
tions’ approval of a member state’s economy a “seal of ap-
proval,”  the institutions’ determination that a particular state 
has been noncompliant can result in the practical elimination of 
the debtor state’s private funding.148  As these repercussions can 
have disastrous financial consequences, a debtor state has every 
incentive to comply with the loan agreement’s terms and condi-
tions.149  
While loan agreements and conditions are of a mandatory na-
ture, they are meant to result from an ongoing dialogue be-
  
 141. Paul Mosley, A Theory of Conditionality, in DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND 
POLICY REFORM: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONDITIONALITY IN 
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 129 (Paul Mosley ed., 1992).  
 142. Swaminathan, supra note 53, at 166. 
 143. Tsai, supra note 71, at 1322. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id.; see also John W. Head, Global Implications of the Asian Financial 
Crisis: Banking, Economic Integration, and Crisis Management in the New 
Century, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 939, 945 (1999). 
 146. Tsai, supra note 71, at 1322. 
 147. Id. at 1322; see also Head, supra note 145, at 945. 
 148. Tsai, supra note 71, at 1322; see also Anthony Galano III, International 
Monetary Fund Response to the Brazilian Debt Crisis: Whether the Effects of 
Conditionality Have Undermined Brazil’s National Sovereignty?, 6 PACE INT’L 
L. REV. 323, 339 (1994); See AGE F.P. BAKKER, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 51 (1996). 
 149. See Tsai, supra note 71, at 1322. 
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tween the debtor state and the IFI in question.150  For instance, 
a government seeking IMF assistance must provide evidence 
that it is “seriously committed to economic reform.”151  This will 
usually take the form of a “letter of intent” outlining “the 
government’s major orientations in macro-economic policy and 
debt management.”152  The typical loan agreement will therefore 
include the debtor state’s proposed policy reforms concerning 
various sectors of the economy and government, while the ar-
rangement itself, will contain additional policy proposals, re-
view schedules, and binding conditions.153  Similarly, in the case 
of many indebted states, the borrowing government “is obliged 
under its agreement with the [financial institutions] to outline 
its priorities in a…‘Policy Framework Paper.’”154  These govern-
ment-generated documents, although heavily influenced by the 
institutions’ input, eventually form the basis for the final loan 
agreement and its appurtenant conditions. 
b.  Conditions as a Policy Tool 
As a general matter, conditionalities are a reflection of poli-
cies endorsed by the IFIs.155  The inherent nature of loan agree-
ments enables the institutions to prescribe a set of policy ac-
tions, which the debtor state must accept in order to receive the 
necessary funding.156 Although the institutions’ economic pre-
scriptions have remained consistent since the 1980s, an exami-
nation into their policy objectives reveals that conditionalities 
have gradually expanded in scope to include not only economic 
but political considerations as well.157  
  
 150. See CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 136, at 53–54. 
 151. Id. at 53. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Erica R. Gould, The Changing Activities of International Organizations:  
The Case of the International Monetary Fund 8 (unpublished paper initially 
prepared for delivery at the 2000 Annual Meetings of the American Political 
Science Association, Aug. 31 – Sept. 3, 2000 (cited with permission of the au-
thor)), available at http://spe.cgu.edu/econ/conferences/2000_peifc/papers/goul 
d_changing_activities.pdf.  
 154. CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 136, at 54. 
 155. Id. at 52. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Carlos Santiso, World Bank and Good Governance: Good Governance 
and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality, 7 GEO. PUB. POL’Y 
REV. 1, 2 (2001). 
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The Washington Consensus emerged in the 1980s as an eco-
nomic orthodoxy that has permeated the institutions’ lending 
facilities since its inception.158  A by-product of free market ide-
ologies, “[t]he consensus’ policy prescriptions include opening 
trade, fiscal restraint, prudent macroeconomic management, 
deregulation and privatization.”159  The consensus evolved from 
the Latin American financial crisis of the 1980s where “[l]oose 
monetary policy led to inflation running out of control.”160  Based 
largely on the political climate at the time, the prescriptions 
utilized in dealing with the crisis (i.e., fiscal austerity, privati-
zation, and market liberalization), were permanently adopted 
by the IFIs as the models for future financial assistance pack-
ages.161   
These policies translated into comprehensive programs of 
macro-economic stabilization and structural economic reform.  
As explained by Professor Chossudovsky, “[s]tructural adjust-
ment is viewed by the IFIs as consisting of two distinct phases: 
‘Short-term’ macro-economic stabilization (implying devalua-
tion, price liberalization and budgetary austerity) to be followed 
by the implementation of a number of more fundamental… 
structural reforms.”162  Conditions under the Washington Con-
sensus may therefore require the debtor state to implement re-
forms including currency devaluation;163 “liberalization of the 
labor market;”164 reduction of the budget deficit;165 “ceilings” on 
state expenditures;166 price liberalization;167 trade liberaliza-
tion;168 privatization of state enterprises;169 tax reforms;170 priva-
  
 158. See Sivalingam, supra note 89, at 2. 
 159. Santiso, supra note 157, at 13–14 (citations omitted).  
 160. STIGLITZ, supra note 55, at 53. 
 161. See id. at 16–17.  
 162. CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 136, at 55. 
 163. Id. at 56 (“including the unification of the exchange rate and the elimi-
nation of exchange controls”).  
 164. Id. at 56–57. 
 165. Id. at 59.  
 166. Id. at 60.  
 167. Id. at 61 (“elimination of all subsidies and price controls”). 
 168. Id. at 63 (“elimination of import quotas and the reduction and unifica-
tion of tariffs”). 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id. at 64 (“[T]he introduction of a value-added or sales tax and changes 
in the structure of direct taxation.”).  
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tization of agricultural land;171 deregulation of the banking sys-
tem;172 liberalization of capital movements;173 and poverty reduc-
tion through targeted social programs.174 
Beginning in the early 1990s, the World Bank and IMF fun-
damentally shifted their policies and strategies by introducing 
the concept of “good governance” both as an objective and a con-
dition for financial assistance.175  This shift in policy reflected an 
increasing recognition by the IFIs “that the reasons for under-
development and mismanaged government are ‘sometimes at-
tributable to weak institutions, lack of an adequate legal 
framework, damaging discretionary interventions, uncertain 
and variable policy frameworks and a closed decision-making 
process which increases risks of corruption and waste.’”176  This 
change also resulted from growing pressure by donor govern-
ments to address the prevalent corruption, economic misman-
agement and bureaucratic ineptness preventing the repayment 
of their financial investments.177  
The World Bank defines governance as encompassing “the 
form of political regime; the process by which authority is exer-
cised in the management of a country’s economic and social re-
sources for development; and the capacity of governments to 
design, formulate and implement policies and discharge func-
tions.”178  The World Bank has distinguished “six main dimen-
sions of good governance: [v]oice and accountability, which in-
cludes civil liberties and political stability; [g]overnment effec-
tiveness, which includes the quality of policymaking and public 
service delivery; [t]he lack of regulatory burden; [t]he rule of 
law, which includes protection of property rights; 
  
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 64–65.  
 173. Id. at 65–66 (“[T]he IMF insists on the transparency and free move-
ment of foreign exchange in and out of the country.”). 
 174. Id. at 66–67.   
 175. Santiso, supra note 157, at 1–2. 
 176. Id. at 5 (citations omitted).  Although the author is specifically refer-
ring to the World Bank, these principles are equally applicable to the IMF. 
See id. 
 177. Santiso, supra note 157, at 4.   
 178. Id. at 4.  Although the World Bank recognizes the importance of the 
political dimension of governance, it interprets the concept restrictively by 
arguing that the focus is solely placed on the economic dimensions of good 
governance.  Id.  
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[i]ndependence of the judiciary; and [c]ontrol of corruption.”179 
 The IMF broadly defines governance as encompassing “all 
aspects of the way a country, corporation, or other entity is gov-
erned.”180  According to the IMF, “[i]t includes the economic-
policy interactions that fall within the mandate and expertise of 
the IMF,” as well as “their effectiveness; their transparency, 
and thus the accountability of policy makers; and the extent to 
which they meet internationally accepted standards and good 
practices.”181  The IMF has recognized two spheres in which it 
considers itself best placed to contribute to good governance, 
namely: 
 Improving the management of public resources through re-
forms covering public sector institutions (e.g., the treasury, 
central bank, public enterprises, civil service, and the official 
statistics function), including administrative procedures (e.g., 
expenditure control, budget management, and revenue collec-
tion); and 
 Supporting the development and maintenance of a trans-
parent and stable economic and regulatory environment con-
ducive to efficient private sector activities (e.g., price systems, 
exchange and trade regimes, and banking systems and their 
related regulations).182 
The introduction of good governance adds a normative con-
cept to the economic orthodoxy of the Washington Consensus, 
giving rise to what some analysts have described as a “post-
Washington Consensus.”183  This newly defined consensus brings 
three important dimensions to the IFIs’ lending facilities.  First, 
the concept of governance recognizes the importance of politics 
and its influence over development matters within the debtor 
state.184  It underscores the need to reform “not only the policies 
but also the institutional framework in which policies are for-
mulated.”185  The IFIs have given increasing recognition to the 
  
 179. Santiso, supra note 157, at 4 (emphasis added). 
 180. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE IMF’S APPROACH TO PROMOTING 
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND COMBATING CORRUPTION – A GUIDE, at http://www.imf. 
org/external/np/gov/guide/eng/index.htm (last modified Dec. 9, 2002). 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. (emphasis in original).  
 183. Santiso, supra note 157, at 14. 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id.  
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fact that macroeconomic policy changes must be complemented 
with effective democratic institutions that are able to support 
the social consequences of structural adjustment programs.186  
The IFIs’ post-Washington Consensus therefore requires 
“strengthening the institutions of governance, enhancing the 
rule of law and enhancing accountability and transparency.”187 
A second dimension of the new consensus concerns the state.  
During the 1980s and 1990s, the IFIs were essentially focused 
on “balancing public finances and reducing the size of the bu-
reaucracy.”188  The role of the state was relegated to second place 
as the institutions placed an emphasis on “strengthening non-
state actors and promoting decentralization and local govern-
ance.”189  The reforms sought by the IFIs, however, necessitate a 
strong and effective state governed by the rule of law.  The in-
stitutions’ lending facilities have included the dual focus of sta-
bilizing and liberalizing the economy while simultaneously “re-
forming the state and strengthening governing institutions.”190  
These latter adjustments entail “improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of governing institutions (in particular the judici-
ary and parliaments), developing sound financial markets with 
appropriate regulations and supervision, enhancing legal and 
regulatory environments, improving the quality of the public 
sector and building social capital and cohesion.”191  While the 
state is expected to become leaner, the transition necessitates 
strong political institutions and a responsive bureaucracy.  The 
IFIs have therefore also begun to acknowledge the crucial role 
of the state and the importance of good governance in providing 
an appropriate legal and regulatory framework to support the 
institutions’ reforms.192 
Finally, the post-Washington Consensus recognizes the need 
to strengthen public institutions.  Public institutions are de-
fined as “formal and informal rules and their enforcement 
  
 186. Id.  
 187. Id.  
 188. Id.   
 189. Id. at 15.  
 190. Id. at 14; see also Moises Naim, Washington Consensus or Washington 
Confusion?, FOREIGN POL’Y, Apr. 1, 2000, at 87–103, available at 2000 WL 
18912666. 
 191. Santiso, supra note 157, at 14. 
 192. See id. at 14.  
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mechanisms that shape the behavior of individuals and organi-
zations in society.”193  As the Washington Consensus often ig-
nored issues of institutional reform, the post-Washington Con-
sensus places an emphasis on addressing fundamental institu-
tional weaknesses, inappropriate public policies and un-
enforced legal frameworks.194 
While the post-Washington Consensus adds another dimen-
sion to the IFIs’ lending facilities, it neither supplants nor lim-
its the policies initially espoused by the Washington Consensus.  
The institutions continue to view sound macroeconomic policies 
as an indispensable basis of financial assistance.  Remaining 
steady in its financial prescriptions, the IFIs’ post Washington 
Consensus has merely broadened the reform agenda to include 
the complex realm of national politics.195 
B. Conditions to Address Terrorism 
As international institutions with unmatched resources at 
their disposal, the World Bank and the IMF are uniquely posi-
tioned to address state failure and the prevention of terrorism.  
To this end, the IFIs could restructure their loan agreements to 
take into account the distinguishing characteristics of a state’s 
slide into failure (i.e., its political goods deficit) in the context of 
terrorism prevention.  While loan funds could help a state de-
liver key political goods, conditions on such loans could serve as 
a vehicle for the implementation of an anti-terrorism regulatory 
framework.196  Incorporating these principles within the IFIs’ 
  
 193. SHAHID JAVED BURKI & GUILLERMO E. PERRY ET. AL, BEYOND THE 
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS: INSTITUTIONS MATTER 11 (1998) (emphasis in origi-
nal).  
 194. Santiso, supra note 157, at 15. 
 195. Id. at 16.  
 196. Both the IMF and the World Bank have done some limited work in 
terms of including anti-terrorism considerations within their policies.  How-
ever, these considerations are currently at a preliminary stage and are limited 
to the issues of anti-money laundering and the financing of terrorism.  More-
over, it is not clear whether these considerations will be included as a condi-
tionality in the IFIs’ financial assistance programs.  See MONETARY AND 
EXCHANGE AFFAIRS AND LEGAL DEPARTMENTS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
& THE FINANCIAL SECTOR, WORLD BANK, TWELVE-MONTH PILOT PROGRAM OF 
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 
(AML/CFT) ASSESSMENTS AND DELIVERY OF AML/CFT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: 
JOINT INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT OF THE WORK OF THE IMF AND THE WORLD 
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loan conditions presents two important issues.  First, can the 
IFIs condition their loans on antiterrorism prevention where 
their respective charters prohibit them from addressing ques-
tions of political and civil rights?  Second, how could such loan 
conditions be structured when the international community has 
not yet agreed upon a comprehensive terrorism convention?  
The following sections will address these two questions. 
1. Moving Beyond Antiquated Mandates 
In examining a possible role for the IFIs in the war against 
terrorism, it is essential to fully appreciate their founding pur-
poses.  In this regard, attention must turn to the IFIs’ constitu-
tional mandates and the significance of their respective scopes 
of operations over fifty years after the Bretton Woods confer-
ence. 
The World Bank was primarily founded with the objective of 
assisting in the economic development of developing member 
states and to promote private foreign investment.197  By con-
trast, the IMF’s purpose is to promote the stability of the inter-
national monetary system.198  An important aspect of the IFIs’ 
financial assistance programs is their categorical refusal to ad-
dress questions of political and civil rights within the borrowing 
member state.  According to the World Bank’s Articles of 
Agreement: 
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political af-
fairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their deci-
sions by the political character of the member or members 
concerned.  Only economic considerations shall be relevant to 
their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed im-
partially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I.199 
The World Bank’s Articles further provide that it is to “make 
arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used 
only for the purposes for which the loan was granted…without 
  
BANK (2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2003/eng/0 
33103.htm.  
 197. See discussion supra at Part III.A.2. 
 198. See discussion supra at Part III.A.1. 
 199. World Bank Articles of Agreement, supra note 80, art. IV, sec. 10., 60 
Stat. at 1449, 2 U.N.T.S. at 158. 
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regard to political or other non-economic influences or consid-
erations.” 200  
Although the IMF’s Articles of Agreement do not have a simi-
lar provision, their general stipulation requiring it to “be guided 
in all its policies and decisions by the purposes set forth”201 has 
been interpreted as having a similar effect.202  Moreover, Article 
IV provides that in exercising surveillance over the exchange 
rate policies of its member states, the IMF shall adopt princi-
ples for the guidance of its members and that “[t]hese principles 
shall respect the domestic, social and political policies of mem-
bers.”203 
The IFIs’ apolitical stance has generated considerable debate 
in recent years.204  It is often argued that the IFIs’ Articles of 
Agreement place a legal constraint on the IFIs’ lending prac-
tices and that financial assistance should therefore not be with-
held on the basis of non-economic reasons.205  This argument is 
based on the belief that IFI loans should be non-discriminatory 
and that in supporting economic, social and cultural rights for 
all, the IFIs have paved the way for greater political freedoms 
while remaining politically neutral.206  According to these “strict 
interpretation” advocates, “[n]o reasonable interpretation…can 
transform prohibition into permission.”207 
Although literally correct, this argument has been under-
mined by the IFIs’ actual practice, particularly within the past 
ten years.208  Both the World Bank and the IMF have signifi-
  
 200. Id. at art. III, sec. 5, para. b, 60 Stat. at 1443–44, 2 U.N.T.S. at 146. 
 201. IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 60, art. I, 29 U.S.T. at 2205, 2 
U.N.T.S. at 42.  
 202. Joseph Gold, Political Considerations Are Prohibited by Articles of 
Agreement When the Fund Considers Requests for Use of Resources, 1983 IMF 
SUR. 145, 146 (1983).  Sir Joseph Gold was General Counsel to the IMF from 
1960-79.  Id. at 148.  
 203. IMF Articles of Agreement, supra note 60, art. IV, sec. 3, para. b, 29 
U.S.T. at 2209. 
 204. Morais, supra note 87, at 88. 
 205. For an outline of these arguments see Morais, supra note 87, at 88. 
 206. Morais, supra note 87, at 88–89. 
 207. Id. at 89. 
 208. See Santiso, supra note 157, at 2 (“During the 1980s and 1990s, the 
scope of [the IFIs’] conditionalities both widened and deepened as IFIs at-
tempted governmental and social re-engineering.”); see also Morais, supra 
note 87, at 90–94 (“the record clearly shows that the IFIs are actually doing 
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cantly expanded their respective scopes of operation since the 
institutions’ inception at the close of World War II.209  Initially 
structured as short-term remedial measures, the IFIs’ lending 
facilities have developed into extensive policy-oriented pro-
grammatic interventions, often encompassing substantial regu-
latory and structural changes within the borrowing member 
state.210  Most notably, however, the IFIs’ introduction of “good 
governance” as both an objective and condition for financial 
assistance has further blurred the distinction between “politics” 
and “economics.”211  This “post-Washington Consensus” has not 
only legitimized the IFIs’ promotion of measures to fight corrup-
tion and improve transparency and accountability of institu-
tions and officials, but has also led to the IFIs’ active involve-
ment in the promotion of legal and judicial reforms.212  In this 
regard, the IFIs have recommended and assisted member states 
in “drafting new laws, amending existing laws, reforming court 
systems and training judges.”213  These legal reforms have 
touched upon politically sensitive areas such as “corruption 
among public officials (both politicians and civil servants), local 
government reform, civil service reform, reform of the court sys-
tem, tax reform, strengthening regulatory and supervisory in-
stitutions, enhancing women’s rights, social security or pension 
reforms, and promoting public participation.”214   
Aside from empirical evidence of the IFIs’ increasingly politi-
cal endeavors, it remains debatable whether a legal analysis of 
the IFIs’ articles of agreement leads to the conclusion that these 
  
much more than they have ever done to promote human rights in a compre-
hensive and meaningful way”).  Id. at 90.  
 209. See discussion supra Part III.A.3. 
 210. See Morais, supra note 87, at 89 (listing the additional areas the IFIs 
have financed such as “reform of civil service, reform of public sector enter-
prises, legal and judicial reform, reform of local governments…rights of in-
digenous peoples,” to name but a few). Id. at 89.  
 211. See Santiso, supra note 157, at 1; see also Morais, supra note 87, at 90. 
 212. See Santiso, supra note 157, at 14 (“An important dimension of the 
post-Washington consensus is the recognition that politics matters for devel-
opment.  It suggests that sustaining development requires reforming not only 
the policies but also the institutional framework in which policies are formu-
lated.”) Id.; see also Morais, supra note 87, at 94 (“IFIs have become very ac-
tive in promoting legal and judicial reforms in their member countries.”).  Id.  
 213. Morais, supra note 87, at 94. 
 214. Id. at 95.  
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institutions are strictly prohibited from delving into the politi-
cal realm.215  Both the IMF and the World Bank were formed as 
specialized agencies of the UN.216  As such, one might argue that 
the UN Charter is hierarchically superior to the IFIs’ own arti-
cles of agreement.  Article 55 of the UN Charter provides that 
“the United Nations shall promote…universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”217  Al-
though the UN Charter also contains a provision prohibiting 
interference in internal political affairs,218 the UN has repeat-
edly interpreted this provision as inapplicable to human rights 
because such matters are not considered to be the prerogative of 
a sovereign state.219  If that is the case, why should the IFIs be 
considered exempt from fulfilling the fundamental objectives of 
a hierarchically superior institution?    
Legal analysis aside, it is clear that the IFIs’ apolitical stance 
has become outdated and that the international donor commu-
nity has given growing recognition to the political barometer of 
borrowing member states.220  To this end, the IFIs should begin 
applying financial and technical assistance in the context of 
anti-terrorism prevention.  Terrorism is not only a politically 
motivated act,221 but it is also an act that has been widely recog-
nized as a violation of human rights.222  As such, and considering 
  
 215. See id. at 90–94. 
 216. Id. at 84. 
 217. U.N. CHARTER art. 55. 
 218. Id. art. 2, para. 7. 
 219. See Olivera Medenica, Protocol I and Operation Allied Force: Did 
NATO Abide by Principles of Proportionality?, 23 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 329, 347–60 (2001). 
 220. See generally Morais, supra note 87. 
 221. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 222. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 149 (1977) 
(stating that terrorist activities or individuals or groups are in clear disregard 
of human rights); U.N. Comm. H.R., Res. 2000/30, U.N. ESCOR, 56th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/167 (2000); U.N. Comm. H.R. Res. 1998/47, U.N. 
ESCOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 158, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/47 (1998); 
U.N. Comm. H.R. Res. 1997/42, U.N. ESCOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 139, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/42 (1997); U.N. Comm. H.R. Res. 1999/27, U.N. 
ESCOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 113, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/27 (1999); 
U.N. Comm. H.R. Res. 1998/73, U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 234, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/73 (1998) (hostage-taking is aimed at the destruction 
of human rights); G.A. Res. 46/51, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 
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the IFIs’ current practice, it falls squarely within their respec-
tive scopes of operation. 
2. Framework 
The next question necessarily becomes: how are anti-terrorist 
conditions to be formulated?  A significant response must not 
only combine prevention with prosecution, but must also suc-
cessfully address the idiosyncrasies of state failure and the do-
mestic prevention of terrorism.  Perhaps most importantly, such 
conditions must be aligned with an anti-terrorism standard ac-
cepted by the international community (i.e., the international 
donor community).  
a.  International Conventions and Protocols 
Although there are a host of multilateral conventions ad-
dressing terrorist acts, there is no comprehensive multilateral 
convention governing terrorism alone.  Specifically, the existing 
ten conventions and two protocols cover: airports and airplane 
hijacking;223 attacks upon “internationally protected persons;”224 
  
283, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/51 (1991); G.A. Res. 3034 (XXVII), U.N. GAOR, 27th 
Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 119, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3034 (XXVII) (1972); Organiza-
tion of African Unity,. Declaration and Plan of Action 12, 
CONF/HRA/DECL(I) (1999), at http://ncb.intnet.mu/mfa/oau/decpl.htm (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2003) (condemnation of terrorism as a violation of human 
rights); Siracuse, Italy: Conference on Terrorism and Political Crimes, Final 
Document: Conclusions and Recommendations, pt. I 1–2, reprinted in M. 
CHERIF, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES xi (1975); Michael J. 
Bazyler, Capturing Terrorists in the “Wild Blue Yonder”: International Law 
and the Achille Lauro and Libyian Aircraft Incidents, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 685, 
688 (1986); Robert A. Friedlander, Terrorism and International Law: What is 
Being Done?, 8 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 383, 387–88 (1977); Jordan J. Paust, The 
Link Between Human Rights and Terrorism and Its Implications for the Law 
of State Responsibility, 11 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 41 (1987); S.C. Res. 
579, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/579 (1985), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 243 
(1986) (taking of hostages and abductions have severe consequences for the 
rights of victims and are manifestations of terrorism); G.A. Res. 40/61, U.N. 
GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 301, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/61 (1985) (terror-
ism violates human dignity and loss of innocent lives, and mindful of relevant 
human rights instruments, all acts of terrorism, “by whomever committed,” 
are unequivocally condemned).  
 223. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 10 I.L.M. 
1151 [hereinafter Montreal Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of 
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thefts of nuclear materials;225 the taking of hostages;226 unlawful 
acts against maritime navigation and fixed platforms on the 
continental shelf;227 terrorist bombing;228 the financing of terror-
ism;229 and the making of plastic explosives.230  Most of these in-
struments place legal obligations upon contracting states to: 
criminalize the acts covered and establish appropriate penalties 
for crimes committed; provide jurisdiction for certain offenses;  
provide custody and make a preliminary factual inquiry of the 
alleged offenders; give notification to interested states of the 
actions taken; prosecute the alleged offender if the state does 
not grant extradition; consider the offense to be an “extraditable 
offence” for purposes of an extradition treaty; and provide assis-
tance in connection with criminal proceedings regarding the 
offences covered.231 
While these conventions and protocols are of tremendous im-
portance, they are inadequate in addressing state failure and 
the domestic prevention of terrorism.  As Jennifer Trahan 
  
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 
[hereinafter Hague Convention]; Convention on Offenses and Certain Other 
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 
U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Tokyo Convention].  
 224. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 
1973, 28 U.S.T. 1977, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Protected Persons Con-
vention].  
 225. See Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 
1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 124.  
 226. See Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. 
No. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Hostage Convention].  
 227. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 101–1, 1678 
U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Maritime Convention]; Protocol for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Conti-
nental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 101–1, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304.  
 228. See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bomb-
ings, G.A. Res. 164, U.N. GAOR 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/52/164 (1997) [hereinafter Terrorist Bombings Convention].  
 229. See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/54/109 (1999) [hereinafter Financing of Terrorism Convention].  
 230. See Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, SEN. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-8, 2122 U.N.T.S. 359 
[hereinafter Plastic Explosives Convention]. 
 231. See Trahan, supra note 52, at 220. 
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notes, they are filled with gaps and inconsistencies and only 
highlight the need for a comprehensive multilateral conven-
tion.232  First, these instruments have little, if any, preventative 
focus.233  If prevention is addressed, it is usually formulated in 
broad language and limited to a single article.234  The Montreal 
Convention, for instance, states that “Contracting States shall, 
in accordance with international and national law, endeavour to 
take all practicable measures for the purpose of preventing the 
offences” covered by the convention.235  The Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons also provides for state cooperation by “ex-
changing information and co-ordinating the taking of adminis-
trative and other measures as appropriate to prevent the 
commission of those crimes.”236  This open-ended language not 
only lacks specificity but may also result in states taking little 
or no action at all.237  
Second, some of these conventions and protocols are inappli-
cable if the acts covered by these instruments occur solely in 
one state.238  For instance, if a terrorist act is committed within 
  
 232. Trahan, supra note 52, at 220–21. 
 233. Id. at 222.  
 234. Id.  
 235. Montreal Convention, supra note 223, art. 10, para. 1, 24 U.S.T. at 571.  
 236. Protected Persons Convention, supra note 224, art. 4, para. b, 28 U.S.T. 
at 170, 1035 U.N.T.S. at 170; see also Maritime Convention, supra note 227, 
art. 13, 1678 U.N.T.S. at 230, 231. 
 237. Although some conventions include a preventative focus, encumbering 
conditions diminish the benefits of such language.  For instance, certain con-
ventions require that information be “accurate and verified” before sharing it 
with other interested states.  See Financing of Terrorism Convention, supra 
note 229, art. 18, para. 3, G.A. Res. 109 at 412; Terrorist Bombings Conven-
tion, supra note 228, art. 15, para. b, G.A. Res. 164 at 393.  Where terrorist 
attacks are in question, this may simply take too much time.  Other conven-
tions provide detailed steps for the prevention of terrorism but include a 
lengthy phase-in process for their implementation.  See Plastic Explosives 
Convention, supra note 230, art. 4, para. 2–3., SEN. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-8, 
2122 U.N.T.S. at 375.  Perhaps the best example of a convention including 
detailed steps for the prevention of terrorism is the Financing of Terrorism 
Convention.  See Financing of Terrorism Convention, supra note 229.   
 238. Trahan, supra note 52, at 225; See also Financing of Terrorism Con-
vention, supra note 229, art. 3, G.A. Res. 109 at 405; Terrorist Bombings Con-
vention, supra note 228, art. 3, G.A. Res. 164 at 390; Hostage Convention, 
supra note 226, art. 13, T.I.A.S. 11081 at 11, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 210; Montreal 
Convention, supra note 223, art. 4, para. 2–3, 24 U.S.T. at 569. 
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a particular state, and the alleged offender and victims are na-
tionals of that state, then these conventions do not apply.239  Ac-
cordingly, should such a situation arise, officials from that state 
are under no international obligation to share information 
about such an offense even if it may be politically related to a 
potentially larger international crime.240  Similarly, other states 
are under no obligation to provide assistance in possible crimi-
nal proceedings within that state.241  Although such provisions 
were meant to safeguard the sovereignty of each contracting 
state, it may prove counterproductive in an era of increasingly 
global terrorism. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, because these conven-
tions and protocols include little if any language addressing the 
prevention of terrorism and do not address acts committed 
within a single state, they impose no real obligation to combat 
domestic terrorists that are active within a particular state but 
have not yet committed a terrorist act.242  Thus, a condition re-
quiring debtor states to sign on to these conventions before re-
ceiving aid from IFIs would be helpful, but would not necessar-
ily be adequate to address the root causes of the problem. 
b.  UN Resolution 1373 
Perhaps one of the best examples of the international com-
munity’s commitment to the fight against terrorism is UN Reso-
  
 239. See Financing of Terrorism Convention, supra note 229, art. 3 G.A. 
Res. 109. at 405; Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 228, art. 3, G.A. 
Res. 164 at 390; Hostage Convention, supra note 226, art. 13, T.I.A.S. 11081 
at 11, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 210; Montreal Convention, supra note 223, art. 4, 
para. 2–3, 24 U.S.T. at 569. 
 240. See Financing of Terrorism Convention, supra note 229, art. 3, G.A. 
Res. 109 at 405; Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 228, art. 3, G.A. 
Res. 164 at 390; Hostage Convention, supra note 226, art. 13, T.I.A.S. 11081 
at 11, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 210; Montreal Convention, supra note 223, art. 4, 
para. 2–3, 24 U.S.T. at 569. 
 241. See Financing of Terrorism Convention, supra note 229, art. 3, G.A. 
Res. 109 at 405; Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 228, art. 3, G.A. 
Res. 164 at 390 ; Hostage Convention, supra note 226, art. 13, T.I.A.S. 11081 
at 11, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 210; Montreal Convention, supra note 223, art. 4, 
para. 2–3, 24 U.S.T. at 569. 
 242. See Trahan, supra note 52, at 228. 
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lution 1373.243  Adopted on September 28, 2001, Resolution 1373 
forms the foundation of the UN’s counterterrorism efforts.  This 
resolution declares international terrorism a threat to “interna-
tional peace and security” and imposes binding obligations on 
all UN member states.244  It also establishes a Counterterrorism 
Committee (“CTC”) consisting of all members of the Security 
Council to monitor the implementation of the resolution.245 
In Resolution 1373, the Security Council mandates that 
states: 
 Refrain from providing any form of support to terrorist 
groups; 
 Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of ter-
rorist acts; 
 Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or 
commit terrorist acts; 
 Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit ter-
rorist acts to use their territories to further terrorist purposes 
against other states; 
 Ensure that any person financing, planning, or perpetrat-
ing terrorist acts is brought to justice and that such acts are 
established as criminal offences in each state’s domestic laws; 
 Afford one another assistance in connection with criminal 
proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist 
acts; 
 Prevent the movement of terrorist(s) through effective bor-
der controls.246 
Resolution 1373 also addresses the financing of terrorism, re-
quiring states to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist 
acts, criminalize the funding of terrorist groups by their nation-
als, freeze the financial assets of terrorists, and prohibit their 
nationals from providing financial assets to terrorists.247  In ad-
dition, states are called upon to increase the exchange of infor-
  
 243. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th mtg., Supp. 1, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1373 (2001). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 3.  
 246. Id. para. 2. 
 247. Id. para. 1. 
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mation regarding terrorists and to become parties to the various 
international conventions and protocols covering terrorism.248   
In essence, Resolution 1373 “requires all member states to 
review their domestic laws and practices to ensure that terror-
ists cannot finance themselves or find safe havens for their ad-
herents or their operations on these states’ territory.”249  To this 
end, the CTC is charged with the review of reports submitted by 
member states of the UN detailing the steps undertaken to ful-
fill the objectives of Resolution 1373.250  Through this on-going 
dialogue, the CTC is to focus on technical capacity building and 
to “work with each state to implement the resolution at its fast-
est capable speed.”251  The reports that have been submitted to 
the CTC thus far have therefore “varied in both quality and 
length, largely reflecting the different levels of capacity among 
states to implement Resolution 1373 and different levels of re-
sources states have to prepare a report under Resolution 
1373.”252 
Although the non-threatening, capacity-building language of 
Resolution 1373 contributed to its widespread support, it is also 
one of its major weaknesses.  There is simply no end-date as to 
the resolution’s implementation, nor is there a timeframe as to 
how long this process could potentially take.253  The CTC also 
has no intention of declaring states to be in compliance with the 
requirements of resolution 1373.254  In fact, as of April 2003, the 
CTC declared that it will not operate as a sanctions committee 
and therefore “will not report to the Security Council those 
states it has determined are not in compliance with the obliga-
tions imposed by Resolution 1373.”255  There is therefore no ul-
timate requirement, other than diplomacy, to comply with the 
resolution’s objectives. 
  
 248. Id. para. 3.  
 249. Eric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 333, 334 
(2003). 
 250. Id.  
 251. Id. at 335. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 336.  
 255. Id.  
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Another problem with Resolution 1373 is that some states 
simply lack the technical and financial resources to implement 
all of the concerns contained in the resolution.  Pursuant to 
Resolution 1373, the CTC has sought to address this issue by 
identifying each state’s specific needs and matching them with 
donors capable of providing the necessary assistance.256  To date, 
over fifty member states have expressed an interest in receiving 
assistance to enable them to adequately implement Resolution 
1373.257  Unfortunately, the CTC does not have the resources to 
provide such assistance.  The successful implementation of 
Resolution 1373 is therefore largely dependant upon outside 
donors that are capable and willing to provide the necessary 
assistance, whether financial or technical. 
Finally, it is questionable whether the submission of written 
reports by member states is sufficient to fulfill the resolution’s 
objectives beyond its preliminary stages.258  Once states have 
reported back to the CTC on their progress with regards to 
Resolution 1373, written submissions may not be sufficient to 
adequately monitor the newly enacted legislation and assess 
the quality of its application.259  Perhaps effective implementa-
tion will require on-site monitoring by the CTC; an authority 
that is neither explicitly, nor arguably implicitly, granted by 
Resolution 1373. 
  
 256. Security Council Resolution 1377 invites the CTC “to explore ways in 
which states can be assisted, and in particular to explore with international, 
regional and subregional organizations: [t]he promotion of best-practice in the 
areas covered by Resolution 1373 (2001)…t]he availability of existing techni-
cal, financial, regulatory, legislative or other assistance programmes which 
might facilitate the implementation of Resolution 1373 (2001)…[and] [t]he 
promotion of possible synergies between these assistance programmes.”  S.C. 
Res. 1377, U.N. SCOR, 4413th mtg., Supp. 1, at 295, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 
(2001).   
 257. Rosand, supra note 249, at 339. 
 258. The CTC divided its work into three stages: Stage A would require 
states to implement the necessary legislation; Stage B would require an ex-
ecutive machinery capable of handling these legislative changes; and Stage C 
would require its proper implementation.  See Rosand, supra note 249, at 
335–36. 
 259. Rosand, supra note 249, at 339. 
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c.  A potential role for the IFIs 
The IFIs could, however, play a vital role in addressing these 
issues and fulfilling the objectives of Resolution 1373.  Both the 
IMF and the World Bank could begin incorporating Resolution 
1373 into their lending facilities by imposing conditions on their 
loans requiring the implementation of Resolution 1373 within a 
specified timeframe.  Each disbursement of funds would there-
fore become contingent on a state’s actual incorporation of cer-
tain counterterrorism measures within its national laws.  Con-
sideration should also be given to make funds available on a 
grant basis to those states most in need of assistance in imple-
menting Resolution 1373.  These grants should be used exclu-
sively for the purposes of Resolution 1373 and could impose the 
same conditions and timeframes as the IFIs’ lending facilities. 
Most importantly, however, the subject areas covered by 
these conditions could be expanded beyond the IFIs’ traditional 
mandates to include areas typically considered outside their 
respective fields of operation.  In addressing the root causes of 
terrorism and the strengthening of weak states, the IFIs’ condi-
tions could emphasize such important areas as prevention, sup-
pression and the exchange of information.  For instance, a state 
could incorporate into its national laws preventative measures 
such as the following:260 
 
 Preventing the use of its territory as a base for planning, 
organizing, executing, attempting or taking part in terrorist 
crime in any manner whatsoever.  This includes the preven-
tion of terrorist infiltration into, or residence in its territory ei-
ther as individuals or groups, receiving or giving refuge to, 
training, arming, financing, or providing any facilitation to 
terrorists; 
 Developing and strengthening systems for the detection of 
the movement, importation, exportation, stockpiling and use 
of weapons, munitions and explosives and of other means of 
  
 260. These suggested measures are largely based on select language from 
the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism.  See Arab Convention 
for the Suppression of Terrorism, Apr. 22, 1998, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL 
INSTRUMENTS RELATED TO THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 152, 155–56, U.N. Sales No. E.01.V.3 (2001) [here-
inafter Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism]. 
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aggression, murder and destruction as well as procedures for 
monitoring their passage through customs and across borders; 
 Developing and strengthening systems concerned with sur-
veillance procedures and the securing of borders and points of 
entry overland and by air in order to prevent illicit entry; 
 Strengthening mechanisms for the security and protection 
of eminent persons, vital installations and means of public 
transportation. 
As for suppressive measures, they could include:261 
 Arresting the perpetrators of terrorist offences and prose-
cuting them in accordance with national law or extraditing 
them in accordance with relevant provisions of any applicable 
treaties; 
 Providing effective protection for those working in the 
criminal justice field; 
 Providing effective protection for sources of information 
concerning terrorist offences and for witnesses of such of-
fences; 
 Extending the necessary assistance to victims of terrorism. 
Furthermore, technical assistance could be provided through 
collaboration between the IFIs, the CTC, and the states receiv-
ing financial assistance.  In order to maintain the integrity of a 
genuine dialogue, the states in question could appoint a com-
mittee of three experts in the subject of terrorism.262  These ex-
perts would have the responsibility of communicating with CTC 
experts appointed by the UN for the specific purpose of engag-
ing in a discourse with states sponsored by the IFIs.  Not only 
would such a structure provide a forum for the exchange of ex-
pertise, but it would also provide a conduit for the exchange of 
information. 
In this regard, once this collaboration is established, states 
receiving financial assistance could enact measures facilitating 
the exchange of information between these states and the CTC 
  
 261. Id. at 157.   
 262. These experts could be drawn from a variety of different fields such as 
academia, the government or private practice. 
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with regards to potential activities and crimes of terrorists and 
terrorist groups.  For instance, these measures could include:263 
 Promoting the exchange of information with the CTC con-
cerning: 
a) The activities and crimes of terrorist groups and of 
their leaders and members; their headquarters and train-
ing; the means and sources by which they are funded and 
armed; the types of weapons, munitions and explosives 
used by them; and other means of aggression, murder and 
destruction; 
b) The means of communication and propaganda used by 
terrorist groups, their modus operandi; the movements of 
their leaders and members; and the travel documents that 
they use. 
 Notifying the CTC in an expeditious manner of the infor-
mation it has concerning any terrorist offence that takes place 
in its territory and is intended to harm the interests of that 
state or of its nationals and to include in such notification 
statements concerning the circumstances surrounding the of-
fence, those who committed it, its victims, the losses occa-
sioned by it and the devices and methods used in its perpetra-
tion; 
 Cooperating with the CTC in the exchange of information 
for the suppression of terrorist offences and promptly notifying 
the CTC of all the information or data in its possession that 
may prevent the occurrence of terrorist offences in foreign ter-
ritory, against such foreign state’s nationals or residents or 
against their interests.264 
Although such conditions would go a long way in the fight 
against terrorism, it is important to note that these measures 
are not meant to modify or supplant the IFIs’ emphasis on the 
concept of “good governance.”  The success of these measures is 
almost entirely based on a state’s ability and willingness to 
adequately implement them.  Accordingly, while loan funds pro-
vided by the IFIs should serve to address a state’s delivery of 
key political goods in the context of state failure, it is important 
for the IFIs to consider the strength of such a state’s good gov-
  
 263. See Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, supra note 260, 
at 158.  
 264. See id. 
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ernance policies.  Similarly, although a state’s grant eligibility 
should largely be based on its capacity to deliver political goods, 
the international donor community must be provided with some 
level of protection and assurance that these funds will be used 
to fulfill the IFIs’ intended purposes.  Good governance must 
therefore remain an essential component of the IFIs’ financial 
policies. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Restructuring the IFIs’ conditions to address terrorism raises 
two important legal questions.  First, whether such restructur-
ing falls outside of the IFIs’ respective mandates and, second, 
whether the IFIs can adequately address the issue when the 
international community has not yet agreed upon a comprehen-
sive multilateral convention. 
Both questions can be answered in the affirmative.  But the 
most important question remains whether we can achieve the 
necessary political consensus to support these changes.  Al-
though this Article does not purport to provide the ultimate so-
lution to the eradication of terrorism, it does provide a method 
through which the international community can help in pre-
venting future attacks.  As we have seen, the importance of set-
ting such a regulatory framework cannot be underestimated.  
The international donor community must therefore be commit-
ted to a long-term investment in the war on terrorism without 
the expectation of immediate results.   
As Abraham Lincoln once stated “you cannot escape the re-
sponsibility of tomorrow by evading it today.”265  Accordingly, if 
nothing is done today to prevent tomorrow’s terrorist attacks, 
we must be ready to accept collectively our responsibility for 
failure to prevent such attacks from occurring. 
  
 265. Quoteland.com: All the Right Words, at http://www.quoteland.com/ 
author.asp?AUTHOR_ID=1042  (last visited Nov. 6, 2003). 
